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illustrate how the applicant "can and will" finalize the appropriation.
The court then reviewed the FW case where FWS and the
Colorado Division of Wildlife ("DOW") owned adjacent submerged
property. FWS wanted a conditional right to expand its storage right,
however, DOW would not grant permission to submerge more land
and expand the storage capacity of the lakes. Therefore, the FWS
court did not grant FWS a conditional right because they did not
obtain permission to enlarge the lake and, therefore, could not put
water to a beneficial use.
West Elk argued the present case was analogous to In re Gibbs
where Gibbs requested a conditional right to withdraw water from a
well located on adjacent property. The well property owner had not
granted access permission. In granting a conditional right, the In re
Gibbs court did not require such permission at the time of the decree
because Gibbs illustrated she could gain access to the well through a
prior easement or private condemnation.
The court found this case more factually similar to WS than In re
Gibbs because the USFS did not grant West Elk an SUP, nor was there
evidence that it would grant an SUP in the future. Thus, absent an
SUP, West Elk could not and would not put water from Bear Gulch
Spring to beneficial use. In finding the water court properly granted
summary judgment, the supreme court concluded there was no
question of material fact and West Elk could not meet the "can and
will" requirement.
Holly Kirsner

CONNECTICUT
Ace Equip. Sales v. Buccino, 797 A.2d 516 (Conn. 2002) (holding that
a pond originally created by damming a natural stream is treated
under the law in the same way as a natural pond with respect to
riparian rights and that owners of abutting land are presumed to
possess riparian rights in the adjoining pond).
Ace Equipment Sales ("Ace") initiated this suit in the Superior
Court of Connecticut seeking an injunction to bar Thomas and Irma
Buccino ("Buccino") from entering onto or using Hall's Pond for
recreational purposes, and a declaratory judgment that Buccino
owned no part of the pond bed. Buccino claimed ownership of a sliver
of subaqueous land at the base of the pond dam and sought a
declaratory judgment regarding that boundary and an injunction to
enforce their right to use the pond and removal of a fence, erected by
Ace, which barricaded their right-of-way. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of Buccino and denied Ace's motion. The issue of
the precise location of the boundary between Buccino's land and that

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

of Ace remained unresolved by this decision.
Gardiner Hall ("Hall") owned all the land under Hall's pond and
surrounding it. The pond was a manmade pond formed by the
erection of a dam and spill way at its southwesterly end. On December
23, 1995, Hall conveyed the dam and mill property downstream of the
pond to the predecessors in title of Buccino who then acquired the
dam and mill property on February 24, 1967. Hall retained the land
upstream from the dam until July 1, 1987, when it was conveyed to the
predecessors in title of Wellington Fish and Game Club ("WFGG")
who acquired the land on July 29, 1996. On September 11, 1996,
WFGG conveyed most of this property to Ace but retained a portion
including about one-half acre of the pond bed.
Buccino and Ace were the only owners of the land abutting the
pond. When Buccino purchased the dam and mill property, they also
acquired rights to take and use pond water for industrial purposes to
meet the needs of the mill and factory on the property and the
obligation to maintain the dam.
Both parties moved for summary judgment on the complaint and
counterclaim. The court concluded that a genuine factual dispute
existed regarding Buccino's boundary line because the court did not
establish whether Buccino owned the sliver of land in issue or had
acquiesced to having the dam as their boundary. However, because
there was no factual dispute that the dam was constructed on land that
Buccino owned and the dam abutted the pond, riparian rights to use
the body of water were still appurtenant to land merely bound by that
water but not extending underneath it. According to the court,
riparian land applies to a tract of land that borders on a watercourse
or lake, whether or not it includes a part of the bed of the watercourse
or lake.
Ace argued abutters of artificial water bodies have no riparian
rights and because the pond was manmade, riparian rights did not
apply. However, the court agreed with Buccino's position that riparian
rights were appurtenant when property abuts an artificial pond in the
absence of contractual restriction or prescriptive extinction of those
rights. Additionally, a riparian proprietor can make reasonable use of
a pond for recreational purposes.
Ace also argued that this right only applied to natural ponds, not
artificial manmade ponds. The court concluded if a natural stream is
dammed so as to form a lake or pond permanently, or for an extended
period of time, that artificial lake or pond is treated the same as a
natural one in terms of riparian rights.
Because Hall's Pond existed as a pond for at least half a century,
there was no proof that the pond was constructed temporarily. The
court concluded that the pond should be treated under the law
similarly to a natural pond with respect to riparian rights. The court
held that the owner of abutting land presumes to possess riparian
rights in the adjoining lake or pond. Thus, because there was no
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evidence that Buccino's predecessors withheld such rights, Ace had, as
a matter of law, the right to use Hall's pond for recreational purposes.
Regan Rozier

City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn. 2002)
(holding exhausting administrative remedies is unnecessary to a
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act claim and finding
unreasonable public trust impairment must be consistent with
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act statutory scheme)
City of Waterbury ("Waterbury") appealed the Connecticut
Superior Court's declaratory judgment for the Town of Washington
("Washington"), which held that Waterbury's Shepaug dam operation
violated the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA")
because it polluted the public trust, but not by becoming a public or
private nuisance. The trial court found alleged excessive diversions
interfered with the Washington's riparian rights, breaching the parties'
1921 contract. On appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the
Washington cross-claimed for injunctive relief, alleging the diversions
unreasonably impaired the public trust, and that relief granted could
not cure Waterbury's breach. The supreme court reversed and held
that: (1) exhausting administrative remedies was unnecessary to a
CEPA claim; (2) the trial court's unreasonable impairment finding was
incorrect because it did not consider minimum flow statutes as within
CEPA's mandate; and (3) Waterbury established a prescriptive
easement against the Washington's riparian rights. On remand, the
court must consider CEPA, public trust and riparian rights claims, as
well as a new remedy for the contractual claim.
A 1921 contract permitted Waterbury to divert, out of the Shepaug
River, only amounts necessary for consumption and storage.
Diversions were unlawful when reservoirs were full. When Waterbury
built a treatment plant in 1988, a reservoir, from which it did not draw,
frequently overflowed.
Waterbury also incurred increased costs
pumping water uphill to "high-service areas," allegedly with a greater
impact on natural resources than necessary. Over-reliance on Shepaug
dam diversions resulted, though other reservoirs overflowed.
Waterbury claimed an 1893 agreement allowed these diversions if
in accord with minimum flow statutes, and therefore also in accord
with CEPA. It challenged the trial court's unreasonable impairment
definition, contending that only administrative agencies have
jurisdiction to determine whether minimum flow statutes are within
CEPA's scope.
CEPA, however, did not require exhausting
administrative remedies because the requirement was neither
statutorily explicit nor implicit. Its legislative history contemplated
administrative relief prior to trial, with judicial discretion over whether
to retain the case or refer it to the agency. The trial court therefore

